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Abstract—The decreased size and cost of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) has
enabled the use of swarms of unmanned autonomous vehicles to
accomplish a variety of tasks. By utilizing swarming behaviors,
it is possible to efficiently accomplish coordinated tasks while
minimizing per-drone computational requirements. Some drones
rely on decentralized protocols that exhibit emergent behavior
across the swarm. While fully decentralized algorithms remove
obvious attack vectors their susceptibility to external influence
is less understood. This work investigates the influences that
can compromise the functionality of an autonomous swarm
leading to hazardous situations and cascading vulnerabilities.
When a swarm is tasked with missions involving the safety
or health of humans, external influences could have serious
consequences. The adversarial swarm in this work utilizes an
attack vector embedded within the decentralized movement
algorithm of a previously defined autonomous swarm designed
to create a perimeter sentry swarm. Various simulations confirm
the adversarial swarm’s ability to capture significant portions
(6-23%) of the perimeter.
Index Terms—Autonomous robots, Decentralized control, Un-
manned autonomous vehicles, Intelligent transportation systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned and autonomous vehicle usage, while increas-
ing in many fields to solve a wide range of problems,
can prove problematic without secure decentralized systems.
Some industry and business use cases such as search and
rescue, firefighting, and environmental clean up have been
found to be more efficiently solved using UAV/UGV and
autonomous swarms. Smart cities in particular show promise
for swarm utilization as many problems must be solved on a
city-wide scale and are too time-sensitive and error-sensitive
for traditional mechanisms. Swarms allow for scalability and
increased reliability while providing resilient problem solving
for smart cities. Problems such as crowd control systems,
lighting control systems, navigation systems, and military
surveillance/protection could all benefit from the use of de-
centralized swarms of autonomous vehicles.
A decentralized protocol, SHARKS (Secure, Heteroge-
neous, Autonomous, and Rotational Knowledge for Swarms),
allows for any number of agents to circle around a target (in
two dimensions) or ensphere a target (in three dimensions) [1].
SHARKS stabilizes quickly through a decentralized algorithm
with two rules. While the initial SHARKS protocol enabled
a highly-resilient and efficiently controlled swarm to estab-
lish 2D and 3D perimeters, it’s susceptibility a coordinated
automated attack was not investigated. In order to evaluate
the feasibility and effectiveness of an adversarial swarm, an
adversarial protocol is defined to interfere with the objectives
of a SHARKS-enabled swarm. A security metric is defined
and the adversarial swarm is assessed based on it ability to
influence the SHARKS-enable target swarm. The remainder
of this work is organized as follows: section II summarizes
this initial SHARK protocol as well as work related to the
intersection of drones, decentralized control and smart cities,
section III introduces the adversarial swarm protocol, section
IV describes the experimental design utilizing a multi-agent
simulator, finally section V and section VI describe the results
and related discussion.
II. PRIOR WORK
Existing SHARKS-protocol research focused on decentral-
ized navigation of drone swarms in smart city applications
without the use of lead nodes in order to mitigate direct
cybersecurity threats [1]. The original SHARKS protocol is
described here for completeness,
A. SHARKS Protocol
The SHARKS protocol enables a swarm of agents to evenly
disperse and then rotate around the target [1]. During a given
computation round, agents move based on two rules related
to the location of a target and the directional heading of their
nearest neighbor. Each agent moves towards the target (Center
Rule) and away from their nearest neighbor (Dispersion Rule).
Moving away from their nearest neighbor is done with a
certain degree of rotation (r) to ensure the agents are capable
of rotating around the target.
1) Center Rule: Each agent is programmed to move a
specified distance (δ) from a primary target. This enables each
agent to stay within a clearly defined distance/range from the
target (δ ± ). Let dist be the distance between a particular
agent and the target, c be the number of units each agent can
move per epoch to satisfy the center rule, loc be the agents
location in the field, and empty be the case where there are
no agents/obstacles at a given location, Algorithm 1 defines
the center rule.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
09
10
9v
1 
 [c
s.M
A]
  2
1 F
eb
 20
20
Algorithm 1 Center Rule Algorithm
1: if (δ − dist > ) then
2: if (loc− c = empty) then
3: move backwards c units
4: end if
5: end if
6: if (δ − dist < −) then
7: if (loc+ c = empty) then
8: move forwards c units
9: end if
10: end if
2) Dispersion Rule: Each agent also aims to move away
from their nearest neighbor, however this is done at an angle
(180 + r)◦ such that the agents maintain rotation around the
target. Again, let r be the rotation applied to each agent, d
be the number of units each agent can move per epoch to
satisfy this rule, loc be the agents location in the field, and
empty be the case where there are no agents/obstacles at a
given location, Algorithm 2 defines the dispersion rule.
Algorithm 2 Dispersion Rule Algorithm
1: Face nearest neighbor
2: Rotate heading/bearing clockwise by 180 + r degrees
3: if (loc+ d = empty) then
4: move d units
5: end if
Since each agent moves c units to satisfy the Center Rule
and d units to satisfy the Dispersion Rule each round, the
movement of each agent is scaled by the d to c ratio (d : c).
Based on prior experimentation, swarms reach stability quicker
by favoring one of these rules over the other instead of
weighting each equally.
B. Related Work
In order to adequately address advanced potential threats
in the context of advanced in smart-cities this work looks
at recent advances in UAV/UGV and autonomous vehicles
technology in smart city applications, navigation technol-
ogy, decentralized approaches, algorithms without lead nodes,
cybersecurity solutions, and research using physical testing
scenarios (see summary in Table I).
Smart cities of the not to distance future are likely to
contain a plethora of applications for Internet of Things (IoT)
devices that support cities in tasks such as communication,
transportation, agriculture, monitoring, disaster mitigation, en-
vironmental preservation, service delivery, pollution mitiga-
tion, energy saving, e-waste reduction, and weather monitoring
[2]. With these advances and increased utilization of intercon-
nected mobile drone systems comes the the security issues
of airspace interference, surveillance and privacy, DOS/DDoS
attacks, scaling issues, information privacy, firmware attacks,
and vendor background system attacks as well as proposed
mitigation techniques [3]. Central to advancing the application
and security of our future smart cities are navigation technol-
ogy, decentralized approaches with and without lead nodes,
cybersecurity techniques, and both physical and simulation-
based testing.
Prior research has investigated the application of a broad
spectrum of technologies to an equally broad spectrum of
smart city applications. Prior investigations include the use of
public safety network between victims and first responders us-
ing space technology, drones, and wearable devices [4], drone-
based park cleaning swarm supervision systems [5], a pollution
profiling platform [6], and autonomous and firefighting system
[7]. Most of these smart city applications achieved objectives
through network that operated without the use of lead nodes.
While some testing was done through simulation any focus on
security was limited on public safety rather than system-wide
cybersecurity and attack resilience.
A significant percentage of a city exists within confined
indoor spaces. Prior research by Chaumette et al. investigated
the use of indoor drones in adverse locations by utilizing
motion capture with synchronous location mapping [8] while
Farid et al. compared various close-environment localization
detection and positioning techniques [9]. Regardless of loca-
tion, a significant issue in autonomous swarms is decentral-
ized coordination and control. Approaches to this problem
include probabilistic density control of autonomous swarms
[10], controllers for shape generation [11], sensor consensus
achievement through particle swarm optimization [12], and
non-homogeneous robotic swarm navigation [13]. Probabilistic
density control of autonomous swarms has been achieved
using Markov chain based approach using a decentralized
density computation [10]. Decentralized controller methods
enable swarms to create two dimensional shapes without re-
quiring inter-agent communication [11]. Consensus algorithm
for distributed sensors through data fusion of neighboring
nodes that outperformed classic algorithms by 16.5% with
little to no delay [12]. Finally, a leader-follower method for
swarm navigation using only local data has been tested with
physical drones [13].
Given the emergent behavior of SHARKS-enabled swarms
other bio-inspired algorithms help frame potential applica-
tions, possibilities, and limitations. Of particular interest are
chaotic behavior systems inspired by ant colonies [14] and
autonomous flying inspired by bird flocks [15]. The ant-
inspired algorithm in [14] utilizes decentralized clustering and
dispersion algorithms for autonomous swarms in two and
three dimensions using a chaotic lead node. Finally, drone
technology is continuously evolving, generally in order to
enhance performance. Examples of these enhancements in-
clude optimization methods for data collection between drone
swarms and sensor networks using lead nodes to create a three-
level network [16], homomorphic encryption scheme to protect
the arithmetic operations in drone controllers for enhanced
security [17], and self-stabilizing UAV swarm system through
visual-based methods rather than global positioning [18].
Given the current state of the art in smart cities swarms,
related technologies, and the lack of focus on security threats,
Ref Focus of Prior Work Smart
City
Nav.
Tech.
Decent-
ralized
Lead
Nodes
Cyber
security
Physical
Testing
[2] Survey, smart city applications for IoT / smart devices + + + + + +
[3] Survey, security issues surrounding drones as well as mitigation techniques - - + - + -
[4] Public safety network between victims and first responders + - - - - -
[5] Collaboration between two projects for park-cleaning swarm supervision + - - - + -
[6] Real-time modular air pollutant modeling through UAV swarms + - - - - +
[7] The utilization of decentralized swarm intelligence for autonomous firefighting + + + - - -
[8] Control over a drone swarm and location awareness through motion capture - + - - + +
[9] Review of swarm localization and positioning in closed environments - + - + + -
[10] Markov chain based approach for the probabilistic density control of a swarm - + + - - -
[11] Decentralized controller methods for swarm shape generation - + + + - -
[12] A novel particle swarm optimization framework for decentralized consensus - - + - - -
[13] A method for swarm navigation using only local data - + + + - +
[14] Decentralized clustering and dispersion algorithms for autonomous swarms + + + - - -
[15] Survey on UAV swarms with inspiration from bird flocks - + + - - -
[16] Optimization data collection technique for drone swarms and sensor networks + + + + - -
[17] A homomorphic encryption scheme to protect drone controllers - + + - + +
[18] Visual-based approach for swarm stabilization with multiple applications - - - + - +
Frequency Count 7 11 11 6 6 6
TABLE I: Related Works Summary
this work provides the following contributions:
1) an explicitly defined security metric for an autonomous
swarm protocol (SHARKS)
2) the definition and implementation of an autonomous
adversarial swarm
3) quantifiable impact of an adversarial swarm
III. ADVERSARIAL SWARM
A. Vulnerability
An autonomous swarm utilizing the SHARKS protocol
depends on its neighbors in order to position and rotate itself
around the target, but it does not rely on communication
between agent, and therefore an agent can not verify the
legitimacy of its neighbor. This introduces the possibility for
adversarial agents to infiltrate the swarm and influence its
behavior. An adversarial swarm may gain access to the target
or interrupt target examination by corralling to swarm and
creating a gap in the circling behavior.
B. Security Metric
Recall that each agent in the main swarm aims to be δ units
away from the center, with agents equally distributed radially
to create a sentry rind around the target (target circle). The
adversarial swarm aims to open a gap in the target circle large
enough to access the target. A clearly defined security metric
is size of the gap created by adversarial swarm. The metric,
percent access, is the largest gap created by an adversary
normalized by the total circumference of the circle created
by all of the agents in the swarm.
C. Adversary Protocol
The adversarial swarm presented here leverages slight ad-
justments to the existing SHARKS protocol in order to create
an incredibly efficient disruptive swarm. Adversarial swarms
that wish to disrupt the SHARKS protocol can enter at a
single point and then corral the agents such that access
can be granted to the target through the opening created.
This adversarial swarm also moves based on two distributed
algorithms. Like the original swarm, each agent moves towards
the target (Adversarial Center Rule) and away from their
nearest neighbor (Adversarial Dispersion Rule) each epoch.
This is done with a certain degree of rotation (r) to ensure
the agents are moving at a reasonable speed around the target.
However, adversarial agents ignore any agent in their way,
they only disperse from adversarial agents, and they disperse
at a slower pace then the original swarm by a factor of .2.
1) Adversarial Center Rule: The first algorithm is almost
identical to the center rule algorithm for our base swarm. Each
agent wants to be δ units from the target, with a buffer of 
units. Like the original swarm, each adversarial agent stays
within a clearly defined distance from the target (δ ± ). Let
dista be the distance between a particular adversarial agent
and the target, c be the number of units each agent can move
per epoch to satisfy the center rule, loca be the adversarial
agents location in the field, and empty be the case where
there are no agents/obstacles at a given location.
Algorithm 3 Adversarial Center Rule Algorithm
1: if (δ − dista > ) then
2: if (loca − c = empty) then
3: move backwards c units
4: end if
5: end if
6: if (δ − dista < −) then
7: if (loca + c = empty) then
8: move forwards c units
9: end if
10: end if
2) Adversarial Dispersion Rule: The dispersion rule is
minutely different than the original swarm. Each adversarial
agent moves away from the nearest other adversarial agent
in the field. Like the original swarm, this is done at an angle
(180 + r)◦ such that the agents maintain rotation around the
target. Once again, let r be the rotation applied to each agent,
d be the number of units each agent can move per round to
satisfy the dispersion rule, and loca be the agent’s location in
the field. Notice that adversaries do not check to see if their
destination is empty.
Algorithm 4 Adversarial Dispersion Rule Algorithm
1: Face the nearest adversarial agent
2: Rotate heading/bearing clockwise by 180 + r degrees
3: move (d * .2) units
IV. EXPERIMENT
The following experiment was designed to assess the se-
curity impact of various adversarial swarms parameters on a
SHARK-enabled swarms.
There were 3,024 unique experiments performed in the
Netlogo multi-agent simulator [19], and each ran three times
for a total of 9,072 runs. These experiments consisted of all
possible combinations of the following parameters:
• Population Size: 8, 16, 32, 64
• Number of Adversaries: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
• Delta (δ): 8, 12, 16
• Epsilon (): 4, 6, 8
• Algorithms Ratio (d : c): 0.5 : 0.5, 0.5 : 1, 1 : 0.5, 1 : 1
• Adversary Delay: No Delay, Stability, Stability + 20
A. Parameters
1) Population Saturation: The first two parameters consid-
ered in this experiment vary the adversarial saturation of the
population, or the ratio of adversarial agents to regular agents.
Some of these experiments have populations that are equally
saturated with adversaries.
2) Stability Region: The next two parameters affect the
shape and area of the stability region. In previous experiments,
regions with larger deltas (but the same area) reach stability
faster (in experiments without adversaries) since there is a
larger circumference for agents to tend to. Notice that there
are stability regions with equal areas (but different delta and
epsilon values) in these experiments.
3) Agent Movements: Agent movements are governed by
the d : c ratio (the number of units an agent can move to
satisfy the Dispersion Rule and the Center Rule) as well as
the rotation applied to each agent. Therefore, the d : c ratio
configuration is the next parameter. Note that the adversaries
and secure agents are tuned the same. In other words, the
secure agents and the adversarial agents have the same d :
c ratio and the same rotation value. The same rotation (20
degrees) is applied in all of these experiments.
4) Adversary Delay: The final parameter for these experi-
ments is the amount of time the adversarial agents must wait
before they can launch their attack. Because this attack works
by corralling agents, it has varying success if the regular agents
have not reached a stable swarming behavior. In each third
of the experiments, the adversaries start at the same time as
the regular agents (No Delay), the adversaries start when the
regular agents reach stability (Stability), and the adversaries
start 20 rounds after the regular agents reach stability (Stability
+ 20).
B. Security Metric Assessment
Since the aim of the adversarial swarm is to open a gap
in the target circle the largest gap opened in the first 10,000
rounds of simulation is divided by the circumference of the
target circle in order to obtain the percentage of the circle
opened. In the results section, this is referred to as ”% Access”
as it is the percentage of the circle that is accessible to the
adversarial agents.
V. RESULTS
A. Population Saturation
The results for these experiments can be seen in Figure
1. The smaller the regular population, the more corralling
the adversaries can do. Also, smaller adversarial swarms
are able to create a bigger opening in the circle because
they can move further apart. For instance, with the smallest
population (8 agents) and the fewest adversaries (2 agents),
the adversarial agents were able to open up 23.54% of the
circumference, while in comparison, the largest population
(64 agents) and the most adversaries (8 agents) were only
able to open up 7.81%. However, for larger populations,
the number of adversaries does not have as much effect
on the results. In the largest population with the fewest
adversaries, the adversarial agents were still only able to
open up 6.53%. This indicates that this type of attack
is more successful against smaller populations and with
fewer adversaries. However, when the regular population is
larger, more adversarial agents may be preferable as they
perform similarly, but would provide for adversarial resiliency.
B. Stability Region
In previous experiments without adversaries, the size of the
stability region effected how quickly the agents were able to
reach stability. Larger delta values (ideal distance from the
target) had the most effect on the stability speed, as there was
a larger circumference for the agents to tend to. This would
indicate that swarms running in environments with larger delta
values would be more resilient to the adversarial swarm.
However, in almost all cases (except for with the largest
epsilon value) this is not the case. In fact, the adversaries had
similar effectiveness across all delta and epsilon values with
all of the experiments averaging to between 11.5% to 14.5%.
These results are summarized in Table II. With only three
percent difference between these results, further investigation
was needed (see the further investigation section).
Fig. 1: Average percent corralled for each population size and
each number of adversarial agents.

4 6 8
8 11.83% 13.02% 14.42%
12 12.51% 13.03% 13.25%δ
16 13.30% 13.42% 13.96%
TABLE II: Percent Accessed Across Various Stability Regions
C. Agent Movements
In these experiments, the results were mostly consistent
across all of the experiments. However, when the d : c ratio
is 1.0:0.5, the adversarial swarm is never able to open up
a gap in the circling behavior. Note that a regular agent (in
these experiments) can not recognize the difference between
an adversarial agent and another regular agent. Since the
regular agents are moving twice as far away from their nearest
neighbor as they are moving toward the target, they are able
to prioritize moving away from an adversary. This indicates
that a larger dispersion rule makes the adversary attack less
effective. Further, a smaller center rule should result in a less
effective attack because the agents stay closer to the ideal
distance from the target. These results can be seen in Table
III. Notice that for a center rule of 1.0, a larger dispersion rule
resulted in a less effective attack and for a dispersion rule of
0.5, a smaller center rule resulted in a less effective attack.
Dispersion Rule (d)
0.5 1.0
Center Rule (c) 0.5 17.60% NULL1.0 18.96% 16.22%
TABLE III: Percent Accessed Across Agent Movements
D. Adversary Delay
Figure 2 illustrates the results for adversary delay. When
there is no delay, the adversarial agents start at the same time
as the regular agents. The adversaries get dispersed among
the regular agents and are unable to create a large opening
due to regular agents interrupting their corralling behavior.
This results in 12.37% accessed by the adversaries on average.
Recall that the percent accessed means the largest gap between
agents relevant to the ideal circumference. So, for example, if
an adversarial swarm were to gain 25% access, there would
be a gap spanning 90 degrees of the ideal circle. When the
adversaries wait until the regular agents reach stability, they are
able to enter the stability region as a unit and start spreading
out. The adversaries are able to corral the regular agents until
they are equidistant from each other. The largest corralling
resulted in 13.62% accessed. When the adversaries wait 20
rounds after the regular agents reach stability, they have similar
results to when they did not add an addition 20 round delay
with 13.59% accessed.
E. Further investigation
Regardless of this observed behavior, the percent accessed
seemed relatively the same across different delays and stability
region sizes/shapes. Notice that variations in population sat-
uration created differing results, while the delay results and
stability region results looked the same across the different
variations (all between 11.5-14.5%). Data was then analyzed
to determine if the population saturation could explain the
relatively equal results seen across different types of delays
and different stability region configurations. To do this, the
percent accessed is plotted against the different population
saturation levels for different population sizes. However, this
did not show much correlation (seen in Figure 3).
Since the different sized areas follow the same pattern and
there is a correlation in population size, the final analysis
compared the average percent accessed across different levels
of congestion. Congestion is defined by the amount of space
in the stability region per agent (area of stability region /
population size). Notice that smaller congestion ratings mean
that the agents are more tightly packed because there is less
space per agent. When the agents are more congested, the
adversaries attack is less successful. This effect levels off
around 75 square units per agent, where the adversarial agents
are able to open around 16% of the circle. These results are
summarized in Figure 4.
Fig. 2: Adversarial swarms movements depending on the amount of delay they invoke. This simulation has 16 regular agents
and three adversarial agents. The ideal distance from the target is 16 units ± 4 units.
Fig. 3: Average percent corralled for different stability region
areas.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Result Implications
These results show that under most cases, the adversarial
agents are able to open up sizeable gaps in the swarm
circling behavior. Gaps allow for adversaries to access the
target as well as prevent comprehensive inspection of the
target by the swarm. This could have consequences in smart
Fig. 4: Average percent corralled for different congestion
rating (stability region area divided by the population size).
city applications. For instance, in swarms circling a hazard
on a road designed for autonomous vehicles, a gap could
allow for an accident to occur. From these results, it is clear
that mitigating the risk for this type of attack would mean
having more dense swarm populations, which could result
in more agent collisions, and smaller delta values, which
might not be possible in some environments. Since neither
of these solutions are ideal and hinder the flexibility of the
SHARKS protocol, more research is needed to provide a way
for the SHARKS protocol to neutralize this type of attack. An
effective neutralization technique would protect the SHARKS
protocol from all corralling attacks.
B. Limitations
These results have many limitations including a lack of
collision tracking and insufficient data on the size of the
opening in units. One of the mitigation techniques involves
changing the delta value to make the opening smaller, however
this would create a tighter, more congested area for UAVs to
move around in. This would likely create collisions between
the agents, which is not tracked in these results. These should
be tracked in future experiments to show the trade off between
this kind of mitigation and the increase in collisions.
Also, these results are compared across different stability
region sizes. To make this consistent across different experi-
ments, the percentage of the circumference that was accessed
was recorded. However, this means that equal scores across
experiments with different delta values actually create different
sized openings.
Further, these experiments are also run inside virtual simula-
tions. There are additional challenges that would be apparent in
real-world experiments. Also, real world applications involve
stationary targets as well as dynamic targets that move around
an environment. Further testing is needed to test the real-world
implications of the SHARKS protocol.
C. Future Work
Future work on preventing attacks on the SHARKS protocol
will look at how to prevent the corralling of agents by adver-
sarial sources. This could include attempting to more precisely
define the possible behaviors of the SHARKS protocol or
modifying the original protocol to mitigate the adversarial
effects of the adversarial agents. This research indicates that
more congested environments result in neutralization of the
attack. Since corralling the regular agents results in more
congestion, there is a bit of implicit protection against this type
of attack, which is why none of the attacks result in more than
25% disruption. This could be leveraged to create an addition
to the protocol that allows the agents to maneuver around
the adversaries when they begin to be corralled. This would
amplify the current behavior to neutralize the adversarial
effects.
VII. CONCLUSION
This research described a adversarial attack against the
SHARKS protocol in which an adversarial swarm (running a
slightly modified version of the SHARKS protocol) is able
to disrupt the intended behavior of the SHARKS swarm.
This research quantifies the effects of the attack and analyzes
which scenarios are more vulnerable to attack. The SHARKS
protocol extends on previous research by evaluating potential
attack vectors and join the call for inherently secure algorithms
by seeking appropriate solutions.
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